In the Kitchen of the Civil Society in Malawi

IN THE KITCHEN OF THE CIVIL SOCIETY IN MALAWI

January 2007


by
Collins Magalasi
ActionAid International Malawi
cmagalasi@gmail.com collins.magalasi@actionaid.org



CONTENTS

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms ………………………………………………………………………………….... 3
Introduction and Executive Summary ……………………………………………………………………………………. 4
Introducing Malawi …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 6
NGOs and CSOs: Definition Used in the paper …………………………………………………………. 6
History and Growth of CSOs in Malawi ………………………………………………………………………………………7
Manifestations of CSOs ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 13
Legal Establishment of CSOs …………………………………………………………………………………………………… 15
Registration ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 15
NGO Law ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 16
Relations …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….18
CSOs and Government ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 18
International CSOs and Local CSOs …………………………………………………………………………… 19
CSOs and Legislature and Political Parties ………………………………………………………………… 20
Ten years from Now: recommendations for CSOs ………….……………………………………………………… 22
Endnotes ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 25
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms
AAIM ActionAid International Malawi
C&S Church and Society
CABS Common Approach to Budget Support
CAP Country Assistance Plan
CBO Community Based Organisation
CLC Civil Liberties Committee
CONGOMA Council of Non Governmental Organizations in Malawi
CSC Christian Service Committee
CSO Civil Society Organization
DC District Commissioner
DBS Direct Budget Support
DPP Democratic Progressive Party
DFID Department for International Development
EHP Essential Health Package
FBO Faith Based Organisation
GBS General Budget Support
GDP Gross Domestic Product
IMF International Monetary Fund
ICSO International Civil Society Organisation
INGO International Non Governmental Organization
LCSO Local Civil Society Organisation
LNGO Local Non governmental Organisation
LRC Legal Resource Centre
MCP Malawi Congress Party
MEGS Malawi Economic Growth Strategy
MG-CSC-WP Malawi Government–Christian Service Committee – Working Party
MGDS Malawi Growth and Development Strategy
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
MPRS Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy
NAC National AIDS Commission
NGO Non Governmental Organization
ODI Overseas Development Institute
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PRGF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
SBS Sector Budget Support
SWAp Sector Wide Approach
UDF United Democratic Party
1.0 Introduction and Executive Summary


The Civil Society sector in Malawi has grown tremendously in size, scope and over the past few years. Today the sector represents over 40% of the formal employment in Malawi. Globally, the number of international NGOs was reported to have increased from 6000 in 1990 to 26,000 in 1999. CSOs have also become significant players in global development assistance with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) reporting that US$11-12 billion in contributions were made annually by CSOs from their own resources by the late 1990’s. [i]

The World Bank defines civil society as the “wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations.”[ii] Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) therefore refer to a wide of array of organizations: community groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), labor unions, indigenous groups, charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, and foundations, just to mention a few.

The civil society sector has become important channels for delivery of social services and implementation of other development programs, especially in times that government presence is weak, in political turmoil, in emergency situations, or where civil society experience and expertise complements government action. CSOs’ influence on shaping global public policy has also emerged over the past two decades as evidenced in the successful advocacy campaigns around such issues as making the G8 focus on Africa, debt cancellation, banning of land mines, and environmental protection which have mobilized millions of supporters around the globe. This paper gives an in-depth discussion on the nature of civil society in Malawi, the environment in which they operate and the opportunities and challenges they face.

Particularly the paper gives in chapter 2 an overview of Malawi. Chapter 2 describes the history and growth of the civil society in Malawi, and takes the reader through CSO experiences before, during and after democracy. The chapter also gives some of the challenges that CSOs face in Malawi, including those of finance. The next chapter gives the manifestations of CSOs in Malawi and summarises localities, sectors and forms of CSOs in Malawi.

Chapter 5 describes the legal establishment of CSOs, requirements for registration and control. It also details the NGO Law in Malawi. The ensuing chapter describes relationships between CSOs and government, the legislature and Political Parties. The chapter also narrates the relations between local and international CSOs. The last chapter gives recommendations for the CSOs in the years to come.









1.1 NGOs and CSOs: terms and definitions used in this paper

Civil Society comprises of a wide range of non state actors. It therefore includes trade unions, employers’ organisations, chambers of commerce, churches, rotary clubs, youth groups, and many more. In this paper the author uses the term Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) to refer to not-for-profit Non state actors that are involved in development. They include trades unions, faith based organisations, women groups, youth groups and many others. The term NGO (Non Governmental Organisation) is used only when it is clear that a donor or government policy document is referring to this term. But for in this paper, the terms NGOs and CSOs are used interchangeably.

Within the CSO category the paper makes the following distinctions:

International CSOs (ICSOs) are CSOs whose origins and headquarters are usually external to the country where they are operating and whose operations span more than one country.

Local CSOs are CSOs indigenous to the country, founded and managed from within. Their operations may have national coverage and they may seek to advance the fight against poverty in Malawi at an international level. But their focus, identity and origins are confined to the country.
Within the definition of `local CSOs’, the paper distinguishes further between national CSOs – those with national coverage and/or those engaging with national policy issues – and Community Based Organisations (CBOs) – those operating at a district level that may engage in district processes and initiatives at times but are primarily focused on development and poverty reduction in their respective traditional authorities. CBOs are linked more to the social welfare department of the district assemblies.2. Introducing Malawi

Malawi is a landlocked country situated in South Central Africa, bordered by Tanzania to the north east, Mozambique to the south east and south west, and Zambia to the west. Lilongwe which is in central region of the country is the capital and administrative city while Blantyre is the commercial centre and is located in the south of the country. National languages are English and Chichewa. Malawi has a land area of 118,484 Km2, of which about a third is made up of Lake Malawi. Real GDP per capita in Malawi averages at around US$ 160-200 over the past five years. Poverty is widespread, social indicators are among the worst in the world and the country has to go a long way to meeting the MDGS[iii]. HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis are widely spread. Malawi’s infrastructure remains weak, with low levels of electrification, tarred roads and clean water supply/sanitation. Malawi, which has a young population, is densely populated, with about 50% living in the south, 39% in the centre and 11% in the north.

The economy is highly dependent on agriculture (particularly tobacco), with the sector accounting for over 38.6 per cent of GDP and employing about 85 percent of the labor force. The sector accounts for 83 per cent of foreign exchange earnings. Agriculture is characterized by a dual structure consisting of commercial estates that grows cash crops and a large smallholder sub-sector which is mainly engaged in mixed subsistence farming. Maize, the staple food, accounts for 80 per cent of cultivated land in the smallholder sub-sector. But agricultural output and productivity are low, mostly rain-fed and lacks diversification.

The country has a weak private sector. Since 1981, Malawi has implemented Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) and the opening up of the economy, as was characteristic of the programme, saw the collapse of many industries. SAPs have since been dubbed by Civil Society Activists in Malawi as “Satana Ali Pano” (SAP) which literally translates into “the devil is here” in local Chichewa language. Worse realities approached the private sector around year 1994 when Malawi’s trade was liberalized. Today Malawi is one of the most liberalized economies in the world, yet among the poorest countries in the world.[iv]

Unlike the private sector, the Civil Society which used to be negligible in the one party state, grew rapidly after 1994. The sector now accounts for over 40% of the formal employment in Malawi. The civil society sector has played, and continues to play, influential role in political, social, economic and cultural affairs of the country. The political practice of Malawi’s leaders has, however, occupied the contribution of most of the civil society organizations of late, ranging from political transition, to fiscal management, accountability and transparency just to mention a few.

Malawi, a former colony of Great Britain and member of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, became independent in 1964 and a Republic in 1966. The country was under the one party leadership of Dr. Kamuzu Banda of the Malawi Congress Party for 31 years before it turned multiparty in 1994. Dr. Bakili Muluzi was the first democratically elected President in Malawi under the United Democratic Party (UDF) and ten years later he was replaced by his handpicked successor, Dr. Bingu wa Mutharika, who has since resigned from the party that ushered him into power and formed his own Democratic Progressive Party (DPP); literally turning the UDF from the ruling, to the opposition, without elections.

3. History and Growth of Civil Society in Malawi

At the time that Malawi became independent in 1964, it can be said that there was no civil society as we define it today. All non-state interventions were linked in one way or another to political institutions and/or parties. A few years later CSOs began to come on to the scene, but only for direct services delivery, particularly in sectors of infrastructure, agriculture, food relief distribution and health. Another characteristic of the CSOs was that many of them had religious link. Christian Health Association of Malawi (CHAM) constituted 40% of health provision in Malawi. It must be pointed out that any CSO that attempted or was suspected to be involved in policy and advocacy was banned outright. Christian Service Committee is one such case. The experiences of CSC are sample of those CSOs that were established before the end of Kamuzu era.

The Case of Christian Service Committee

The Christian Service Committee (CSC) was the first faith based organization (FBO) constituted in the independent Malawi in 1966 as a service delivery organization.[v] It was however formally registered with the government of Malawi in 1968/69. In 1970 the CSC developed an empowerment programme called “Development Animation.” The programme, which had a Mr. Panje as its programme officer, was aimed at teaching communities to take charge of their own development and not to rely on government and other external players for their sustenance. The programme had district structures, including district committees with District Chairpersons to facilitate its delivery. All this was after the constitution saw removal of the Bill of Rights that was in the colonial constitution.

This programme got CSC into trouble, for in 1976 Government of Malawi closed it down. It all started with Mr. Mlombwa, who was District Chairperson of the Malawi Congress Party in Dedza, who reported the district structure and titles of the Development Animation programme to the then only political party; the Malawi Congress Party (MCP). CSC was essentially closed down.

Recalls Mr. Nandolo:[vi] “I was in Rumphi at that time. I was called to the District Commissioner’s office only to be told that CSC was closed down and I had to leave for Blantyre ... in Blantyre I found the CSC building was surrounded by police and no one was allowed into the building.”

CSC was reopened after about a week of negotiations and submissions. But this time it was a changed CSC. The modus operandi changed, the district structures aware disbanded, and every time CSC staff wanted to carry out programmes in the districts, they needed to pass through the District Commissioner’s (DC’s) office who was providing members of the Malawi Young Pioneers to accompany them. CSC had to be reporting every month to the government of Malawi, and this was the start of “Malawi Government-CSC-Working Party (MG-CSC-WP),” a kind of Memorandum of Understanding. MG-CSC-WP held at least a meeting every month where CSC was giving updates on its programmes to government. Since then all civil society organizations coming to work or were working in Malawi had to have these Working party agreements.

In 1982, the World Vision International came to Malawi, followed by the Red Cross, and many more came in. Each organisation had to sign “Malawi Government Working Party” and this soon proved difficult to manage on the side of government; and called for some control house, a forum where these MOUs would be cleared and managed. The forum was created in 1984 and was called the Council for Social Welfare Services in Malawi. The Council changed name in 1992 to Council of Non Governmental Organisations in Malawi (CONGOMA). CONGOMA has since its birth had Malawian Executive Directors in the following order: Mr. Javis Chakumodzi, Mr. Tomoka, Mr. David Faiti[1] and now Mr. Ted Nandolo.

It must be pointed out here that the coming in of international nongovernmental organisations also brought other interesting organisations. For example the World Vision International facilitated to coming into Malawi of organisations such as Graham Carr – an audit firm, which is a private organisation.

The experience that CSC went through is sample of trends / experiences of the CSOs established before the end of the autocratic rule of Dr. Kamuzu Banda.

3.1 CSOs just before referendum

Most CSOs that were born around the early 1990s were registered as charity / direct social service delivery organisations, even if they were meant to be in human rights and policy advocacy. This was due to the manifested strong hand of the MCP government. The Evangelical Alliance for Rights and Development (EVARD), for example, was formed in 1988 with focus on the plight of Mozambican refugees in the south of the country, in particular dealing with questions of the environment and traditional relief work. But towards the 1994, EVARD changed focus to civic education related to the general elections.

3.2 CSOs after the Referendum

Malawians voted for multiparty system of government in 1993. During this period, more CSOs were born with clear focus on human rights, particularly abuse monitoring and exposure, documentation, seeking accountability and voter and civic education.

The Church and Society (C&S) Department of the Blantyre Synod was established in November 1993 with focus on civic education, reporting and monitoring, and voter education covering the theology of human rights. The Civil Liberties Committee, a network of individuals, rather than organisations was established in 1992 with motivation for organized monitoring of human rights violations by domestic groups--a function previously carried out by external organizations. CLC’s objectives were the documentation of human rights abuses, public education, and case action on the behalf of victims of abuse. Legal Resources Centre (LRC) was established in March 1993 under the auspices of the Law Society of Malawi to educate Malawians about their human rights, legal representation of the needy and low-income earners, as well as related research. The LRC held conferences on constitutional and electoral reform.

3.3 CSOs in multiparty

A few years after the first multiparty elections of 1994, CSOs continued to pursue their clear politics-related civil education, political rights monitoring and reporting. However towards the millennium, more social and economic policy and advocacy organisations were born. Hundreds of CSOs were established and the majority were in the service of policy and advocacy. Even the CSOs that were initially only in political rights sector expanded or switched to socio-economic and cultural rights. The impact of such CSOs cannot be doubted, but a lot more could be done to ensure that the CSOs make bigger impact in policy and practice of government and donors as the CSOs did in political rights sector. Government of Malawi has accused CSOs in advocacy of ‘speaking without thinking’ and ‘accusing government without evidence,’[vii]
The civil society organizations working in policy and advocacy face many challenges.

3.4 Challenges to CSO Engagement in Policy Processes

Overseas Development Institute (ODI) identified main obstacles to CSO engagement in policy processes and interestingly the majority obstacles were internal to CSOs “with respondents listing insufficient capacity and funding (62% and 57% respectively) as their biggest constraints. Others cited the closed nature of the policy process as an impediment to their participation, with 47% of respondents noting policymakers do not see CSO evidence as credible. ”[viii] The following chart gives more:
Source: Kornsweig et al (2006)

CSOs soon came to realise that working in isolation was not going to make the difference they wanted. In addition, CSOS in general have limited understanding of specific policy processes, systems, institutions and actors. CSOs also have weak strategies for policy engagement, inadequate use of evidence and have weak communication approaches in policy influencing. These problems were appreciated by members of the civil society and this ushered in a new breed of organisation: civil society networks. The networks in reference differ from CONGOMA in the sense that they have in their membership the unregistered organizations and associations, and they are issue based.

CSO Networks

The first CSO network (after CONGOMA) was the faith based “Jubilee 2000 Malawi” which was campaigning for external debt cancellation. The Catholic Church was instrumental in the formation and coordination of this network. Other policy networks that followed were around/after year 2000 are the Malawi Economic Justice Network (MEJN), the Civil Society Coalition for Quality Basic Education (CSCQBE), Civil Society Agriculture Network (CISANET), the Advocacy and Users Group, Malawi Health Equity Network, the LandNet, Food Security and Agriculture Network (FOSANET), Human Rights Consultative Committee, MAREFO just to mention a few. Some of these networks are formalized, registered and are having fulltime office and staff. Networks play critical role in bringing CSO stakeholders together around particular issues, helping sieve the right information for decision makers, amplifying the voice of the concerned, sharing capacity amongst members and also facilitate transfer of professionalism within the civil society.

3.5 Resources for CSOs and the role of Donors

Most CSOs in Malawi are donor dependent. They rely of donors for almost every aspect of their work. Indeed donors have exploited this muscle and have had more influence in shaping the nature of NGOs in Malawi than acknowledged. They have done this by coming out with resources meant for particular sector and with strings of accountability and reporting. This can be seen from the plethora of Human Rights focused CSOs in the first half decade multiparty dispensation. More donors put forward more resources into human rights and this translated into more CSOs working in human rights sector. When donor priorities changed, CSOs were also up for change.

Towards the millennium, Malawi, under the supervision of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), engaged the process of developing Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). A core principle underlying the whole Poverty Reduction Strategy approach was that strategies should be `nationally-owned’, not just government-owned. National ownership, said the IMF and World Bank, should be promoted through broad-based participation of the civil society in PRS’s,[ix] and meaningful participation should consider:[x]

i. The role of key actors (including parliaments, labour unions, trade and business associations, NGOs, mass media)
ii. Mechanisms for participation
iii. Sustainability of participatory processes (moving beyond consultation in PRS formulation to implementation, monitoring and evaluation of PRS’s)

This opened space for civil society in policy formulation in Malawi. A fairly consultative review process of the MPRS involving CSOs fed into this PRSP formulation process. The Malawi Economic Justice Network (MEJN) was appointed lead CSO in the MPRS process with mandate to mobilize and coordinate civil society to take part in the technical working groups and drafting committee formed for the MPRS annual review.

Bilateral donors began to recognize the role of the civil society in policy. DFID, for example, emphasises civil society participation in its background briefing on Poverty Reduction Strategies it states that `to ensure real ownership [of PRS’s], a wide variety of groups need to be involved in this debate and priority setting: the government, civil society and political opposition parties.’ It goes on to highlight the benefits that broad based participation can bring to poverty reduction:

`In particular, participation can improve the PRS process…The views and knowledge of the poor are important in diagnosing the causes of poverty. Policies are more likely to succeed if their choice has been influenced by civil society consultation and the voices of the poor. As a strategy comes to be implemented, the government will get clearer signals about what is happening if poor people are involved in monitoring the process.’ [xi]

Why DFID supports civil society organisations
`Civil society plays an important role in reducing poverty, complementary to the roles played by governments and the private sector, including:
· Building voice and accountability: civil society helps build effective and accountable states and supports voices for change.
· Providing services and humanitarian assistance: civil society can play an important role, particularly in fragile states, by delivering services to poor people and developing new innovative approaches to reducing poverty. It also has an important role to play in responding to humanitarian crises.
· Promoting awareness and understanding of development: a strong UK development community is important for building public support for development, contributing to policy debates and holding the international community to account.’

From `Civil Society and Development: How DFID works in partnership with civil society to deliver the Millennium Development Goals’ DFID, 2006

Today, almost every CSO in Malawi has policy and advocacy on its agenda, in addition to having staff dedicated to writing proposals and accounting to donors.

Towards the end of the 90s, most donors changed modalities of their support to governments. Direct Budget Support, a form of so-called `programme aid’ (i.e. non-project aid intended to finance the government budget) ushered in. Programme aid itself is not new. For example, the IMF and the World Bank have been providing programme aid in the form of support to governments’ structural adjustment programmes since the 1980s. Food aid, debt relief and other balance of payments support are also classed as `programme aid’. But the late 1990s saw the rise of a new kind of Budget Support specifically intended to support national Poverty Reduction Strategies. In this case governments are expected to be in the driving seat and CSOs and other players must follow and complement government’s priorities.
DFID’s strategy paper for example `Making Government Work for Poor People’ of 2000 focuses on the need to support national governments in delivering national strategies for growth and poverty reduction. By 2004/05, DFID’s Departmental Report showed that in four countries General Budget Support made up 70 per cent of DFID’s programme and in another four countries, it was over 50 per cent.

Ntonya and Magalasi (2006) states that by the post-PRSP period, some donors were of the opinion that a more genuine partnership should be encouraged through more direct support to the Malawi government and closer alignment of aid behind government plans and systems. Indeed, in the case of Malawi government having produced the Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy, many donors felt it was time to move away from the piecemeal `project approach’ towards funding government budgets directly. Not all donors have embraced this approach in Malawi but for DFID, the World Bank, European Union and Norad, Direct Budget Support - or what others call Poverty Reduction Budget Support - is the logical consequence of the new thinking described above.

There are fears within the CSOs that the coming in of DBS will compromise the independence of CSOs who see themselves as watchdogs of government. Now that donors are cutting down projects that have essentially been run by CSOs, the CSOs fear they are expected to be subcontracted by government if they are to remain in business. In Malawi the health sector has Sector Wide Approach (SWAp), a form of DBS, and CSOs in the health sector such as CHAM, Banja La Mtsogolo are ‘subcontracted’ to delivery a service.

In 1999, the Government of Malawi, through the Ministry of Health together with key donors decided to move away from a project approach to developing the health sector to a Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp).The stated objective of the health SWAp is to improve efficiency and effectiveness of health services through strengthening and rationalization of existing systems. The SWAp is based on support to the Essential Health Package (EHP) to improve health service delivery in Malawi. The main instrument of implementing the SWAp is the Programme of Work (POW) covering 2004-2010. The implementation of the activities will be based on Annual Work Plans (AWP) drawn up at the district level and contained in District Implementation Plans (DIPs).

It is estimated that approximately US$ 735 million will be required to implement the SWAp POW over the six year period, the majority of which will come from donors. The major donors are DFID (GDP 100 million), Norway (USD 60 million) and the Africa Development Bank (USD 21.85 million). The coordination of the POW will be through two modalities namely the Health Sector Review Group (HSRG) and donor sub-group on health. A memorandum of Understanding (MOU) relating to the health SWAp was signed between government and donors in 2004.

As already stated, there is now more donor funding available to CSOs for policy, advocacy and campaigning activities,[xii] whether it is CSO monitoring of public expenditure and the implementation of poverty reduction strategies, support for evidence policymaking, or encouraging citizens to campaign for the realisation of a diverse range of rights (from civil and political rights to social, economic and cultural rights).

Theoretically, donor funding in these areas is intended to strengthen the capacity of civil society to hold to account those bodies which have power, influence, or responsibilities over local populations and resource use, whether it be the government, the private sector, or international institutions. However less funding is available for CSOs to scrutinise donors’ own practices. In this way, country ownership of the development process is supposed to be strengthened, extending beyond government to the population at large, in accordance with PRS philosophy.

4. Manifestations of the CSOs in Malawi

CSOs in Malawi are spread across the country, and across sectors. In the early years of multiparty in the country, the majority of CSOs were in the sector of human rights. Around the millennium, there were more CSOs in policy and advocacy, including budget tracking and evaluation. The fastest growing sub sector is the HIV/AIDS where, with the coming in of the Global Fund, thousands of Community Based Organisations (CBOs) have been born. This has also seen LCSOs that used to be in political rights, for example, adding HIV/AIDS in their work.

A distinct characteristic of CBOs is that they are largely rural based, operating in voluntary system and are linked more to, and supervised by, the social welfare department of the district assemblies. They are managed by an Executive Director who is often times the founder of the CBO. Unlike LCSOs, CBOs are not members of CONGOMA. Most CBOs do not have organisation systems such as accounting yet and do not manage many resources. As stated above most of them are working in the sector of HIV/AIDS and social marketing.

In terms of location by sector, most CSOs that are in direct service delivery such as water and sanitation, agriculture, education etc are in rural areas disregarding whether they are LCSOs or ICSOs.

Some commentators have argued that donors’ apparent embrace of CSOs’ policy and advocacy work is deceptive in that funding has tended to be directed towards the more moderate and less political CSOs rather than to grassroots activists with a real social cause or to social movements, thereby neutralising radical political dissent through this selective support.[xiii] This paper found no evidence of an overtly political agenda behind Donors’ CSO funding strategy or behind that of any other donors providing (though admittedly most of the NGOs consulted were in receipt of donor funds and therefore did not reflect the views of CSOs completely outside the donor fold).

However, some CSOs interviewed did feel that there is a donor bias towards funding the policy and advocacy work of urban-based, national NGOs – usually dominated by educated professionals – rather than the advocacy initiatives of district-level CSOs, in spite of the increasing amount of government resources now flowing to the district level. For example, very few district-level NGOs hve had the means to participate in the various monitoring and review processes related to the Constitution, PRS, Public Expenditure Reviews or the SWAPs processes, even though the experience of these NGOs arising from their proximity to poor rural communities would be extremely valuable to urban-based NGOs, governments and donors alike.

A new breed of CSOs have ushered in: Social Forums and CSO networks. Social Forums are unstructured, they have no legal entity but just a grouping of like minded organisations and individuals that come together on issues. The forum has proved to be a very powerful mobilization tool that even the government of Malawi watches what issues are discussed. The Social Forum concept was brought by the people that attended the World Social Forum (WSF), an international forum against neo-liberal policies and capitalist led globalization. The first World Social Forum (WSF) was in Porto Alegre, Brazil in 2001. The World Social Forum is an annual event that is deliberately organized to coincide with the World Economic Forum. The timing of the World Social Forum is meant to signify civil society voices “opposing the high level profit motivated deliberations at the expense of poor countries and their citizens.”[xiv]

Whilst individual CSOs can be limited in its constituency, scope and impact, the establishment of networks has brought about wider net casting for civil society, particularly around policy and advocacy. Most of the networks are policy and advocacy oriented. Some of the policy networks in Malawi are general such as the Council for NGOs in Malawi (CONGOMA) and Malawi Economic Justice Network (MEJN), while most are sectoral including the Civil Society Coalition for Quality Basic Education (CSCQBE), Civil Society Agriculture Network (CISANET), the Advocacy and Users Group, Malawi Health Equity Network, the LandNet, Food Security and Agriculture Network (FOSANET), Human Rights Consultative Committee, and MAREFO just to mention a few.

4.1 Issues with working in networks

Collaboration in NGO networks is time-consuming and frequently problematic as it involves bringing diverse and often competing groups to a table in order to develop a common agenda and strategy. `The formation of CSO networks has been a continuing process,’ comments Anthony Mangani, `but strong solidarity among the CSOs has been missing’. Meanwhile there are complaints that the secretariats of some networks have a tendency to express a position or take action on something without consulting network members, sometimes functioning like an individual CSO rather than acting on behalf of network members.

Nevertheless, the view from agencies consulted for this paper (mainly CSOs but also donors and governments) is that the creation of CSO policy networks has significantly increased and facilitated CSO influence over policy processes. It is observed that the CSO policy interaction with government is stronger now that the former are organising themselves into sectoral structures. Networks such as the Malawi Economic Justice Network (MEJN), the Malawi Health Equity Network (MHEN), Civil Society Agriculture Network (CISANET) and the Civil Society Coalition for Quality Education (CSCQBE) are now an accepted part of the policy process in Malawi.

4.2 Governments and donors: a block or aid to networks?

As explained, the growing numbers of CSO policy networks has been driven by increased support such networks now receive from donors. Donors and governments have consistently appealed to NGOs to harmonise and coordinate their activities for the same reasons that donors are harmonising (i.e. to avoid duplication, reduce transaction costs etc), yet government and donor behaviour has sometimes hindered rather than helped the effectiveness of networks, particularly on questions of ‘who elected you’ when networks raise raw nerves in policy and practice of government and donors.
5. Legal Establishment of CSOs in Malawi

Most Civil Society Organisations in Malawi are established under either of two main legal regimes. These regimes are as follows:
q Trustee Incorporation i.e. a Trust.
q Company Limited by Guarantee for charitable organisations

Each one of these legal regimes has its own peculiar features that distinguish it from the others. These deal with registration of the entity to create it into a legal entity as an independent corporate body. However once the corporate body has been created or established, for an NGO there is a requirement to also register under the NGO Act. This second registration is not a creation of another legal entity but only to obtain a certificate of recognition without which that legal entity will not be recognised as an NGO nor will it be granted the privileges and incentives granted to NGOs. Privileges include duty waivers on selected materials used by the CSO such as vehicles.
There are other legal regimes that exist but not very applicable to CSOs. These are Cooperative Society under the Cooperative Societies Act, whereby an association or group of members can register under this Act and become a legal entity. The other legal entity type is that of a Statutory Body. This is a legal entity created by an Act of Parliament and is therefore clearly out of question for the CSOs. Another legal entity form is that of a Partnership which is a legal entity formed by two or more people for a common goal.

5.1 Registration of NGOs in Malawi
Registering an NGO in Malawi can be said to be easy depending on the regime that one wants to take. As such it can take an organisation to be registered from as little a time as one week to years. Trustee Incorporation is approved by the Minister of Justice and this can be longer if the Minister is seeking clarification or is in doubt about the organisation’s credentials.
Part VI of the NGO Law (2000) gives requirements for registration of an NGO. A filled in application form is to be accompanied by:
1. a certified copy of the constitution of the NGO
2. Registration fees as may be prescribed by the board from time to time
3. plan of activities which the NGO intends to undertake
4. approval from responsible Ministry in a form of a Memorandum of Understanding or otherwise
5. Proof that the NGO is member of CONGOMA
6. A statement that the NGO shall not engage in partisan politics including electioneering and politicking, and
7. the source of funding for the NGO

The NGO Law makes it mandatory for NGOs to be registered with CONGOMA first, before registering with the NGO Board. Currently Malawian NGOs and International NGOs have to pay MK12,000 and MK32,000 respectively annually to CONGOMA. NGOs also have to pay MK 50,600 to the NGO Board.

5.1.1 Registering Local NGOs with CONGOMA
To register with CONGOMA, local NGOs have to provide the following:
1. A filled CONGOMA Membership Application Form
2. Articles of Association or a Governing Instrument of the NGO
3. A copy of minutes of the first meeting at which it was agreed to form an NGO
4. A brief Concept Paper outlining the Activities or Programmes that the NGO intends to undertake in Malawi
5. Sworn-in Affidavits of at least two trustees and/or Directors, giving their names, citizenship, occupation and address
6. A copy of Trustees Declaration
7. A copy of Certificate of registration with the registrar general
8. payment of a processing fee of MK 500.00

5.1.2 Registering International NGOs with CONGOMA
To register with CONGOMA, INGOs have to provide the following:
1. A filled CONGOMA Membership Application Form
2. Articles of Association or a Governing Instrument of the NGO
3. A copy of the Registration Certificate of the NGO from the originating Country
4. A brief Concept Paper outlining the Activities or Programmes that the NGO intends to undertake in Malawi
5. Sworn-in Affidavits of at least two Malawian trustees and/or Directors, giving their names, citizenship, occupation and address
6. payment of a processing fee of MK 500.00

5.2 The NGO Law: Victim of Game called Politics
The Malawi NGO bill was drawn in 2000 but passed into law in 2002. It must be stated that the idea of NGO law came from the civil society. A draft bill was put together by the CSOs and submitted to Cabinet for its blessing. According to Mr. Nandolo, the Executive Director of CONGOMA, members expected that Cabinet would refer to the CSOs incase there are clauses they did not understand or were not in agreement with. However to the shock of the CSOs, Cabinet amended the draft bill and incorporated clauses that disfavoured NGOs and submitted to parliament for approval without referring back to the originating CSOs. The bill was passed into law by parliament but was rejected by the NGOs.

It is said that the then government in power, the United Democratic Front, wanted to shed off CSOs that would be involved in activities that would stand in its political aim of retaining power in the 2004 general elections. Hence the Cabinet adding into the bill section 20(iv) that requires NGOs “not engage in partisan politics including electioneering and politicking.”

Specifically the NGO Bill addresses issues relating to registration and requirements for the NGOs operating in Malawi so that there is equitable sectoral and geographical distribution of the NGO activities in Malawi, accountability and transparency of NGOs in their activities; co-ordination and consultation with Government in implementation of activities of NGOs and uniformity in the interpretation of policies. The bill makes it mandatory for every NGO established or operating in Malawi to register with the NGO Board and be member of CONGOMA, where in both situations the NGO has to make financial support. This requirement has been challenged by many civil society organisations as unconstitutional arguing that it forces an entity to be a member of a particular organisation. Part of the requirements of registration under this NGO Act is that the legal entity must be a member of CONGOMA which is an association of NGOs. But section 32(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Malawi says: “No person may be compelled to belong to an association.” By requiring that an NGO will not be registered under the NGO Act unless it is a member of CONGOMA, the Act is compelling an entity to be a member of an association. To-date there is no Court decision on the matter and neither is there a case pending in the High Court on this issue. It must be stated here that the law was produced without an NGO/CSO policy and as such even operationalising the NGO Law would be difficult in the absence of the policy. It can therefore be said that in practice, the Malawi NGO law is under moratorium. Currently the NGO Policy is being developed and CONGOMA is facilitating review of the law and hopes to submit the same to the end-of-year sitting of parliament.


6. Relationships

6.1 Between Civil Society and Government

“In the kitchen”

The relationship between civil society and government in Malawi is growing stronger, courtesy of the MPRS process, where initially the civil society gate-crashed for involvement but later proved to be asset for the government.[xv] Government now expects and makes demands to CSO to give it information, analysis and interpretation. CSOs are invited to policy formulation fora and processes by government. The latest Malawi Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS), for example, has been engaged proactively by the civil society. CSOs are also part of the Constitutional Review process. The challenge that CSOs have is to prove their salt; that they can provide constructive alternatives to the government policies. It is clear, however, that government needs CSO at formulation of policy stages, and not at implementation.

“The Prosecution”

It must be reiterated that this is cordial relationship is but new and is a phenomenon of the mid 2000s. CSOs and government have clashed before on several occasions, notably at the time the former State President Bakili Muluzi attempted to stand for presidency for a third term. The civil society stood a very strong force and the Muluzi campaign failed to pass through. Government dubbed the CSOs as agents of opposition parties.

Influential CSOs have been threatened with de-registration before but so far no one organisation has been deregistered. Also leaders of critical institutions have been the target of the former government. The former Executive Director of the Malawi Economic Justice Network went into hiding two weeks just before the 2004 presidential and parliamentary elections for fear of his life and that of his family. His vehicle was attacked and smashed by the Young Democrats, the violent wing of the United Democratic Party, and he kept changing houses after his Falls Estate house was attacked by a group of Young Democrats. He became target of attack simply because his organization was exposing abuse of national resources by the ruling party in the run up to elections. The organization also produced the first ever Civil Society manifesto in Malawi. Another example is the beating up of the Executive Director of Civil Liberties Committee in the same year by Young Democrats in front of the police after she had exposed human rights abuse by the government officials. Malawi now has a new government and it has not yet clashed with CSOs, suffice to say it is intimidating them and it has so far arrested member of the media for allegedly insulting the president. The government has arrested several former member of the government for corruption and early this year arrested the Vice President for allegations of treason.



“Sent”

A new challenge has come in as far as the relationship between CSOs and government is concerned. With the advent of Direct Budget support referred to above, where CSOs are expected to get to bed with government in service delivery, government has a new sieve that does not allow critical policy CSOs to pass through. A key challenge is that CSOs’ legitimacy in the eyes of governments tends to come from their role in delivering services, in a way taking over the responsibility of government in providing services to its people. More established and recognized local CSOs such as CHAM and Banja La Mtsogolo (BLM) are closely engaged with government at the policy level and are included in a number of implementation committees. In contrast, the Malawi Health Equity Network (MHEN), which is advocacy focused, enjoys relatively less trust and engagement with government.

Question of legitimacy

There have been statements questioning CSO legitimacy to hold the Malawi government to account. Indeed there is clearly a question as to where CSOs fit into this chain of domestic accountability and how they relate to citizenry. CSOs are part of wider society but they do not speak for all of it. Indeed some commentators make a distinction between member-serving, and third-party serving, CSOs. Member-serving CSOs (community-based organisations, trade unions, professional associations etc) are representatives of citizens and therefore have clearly defined constituencies. Third-party serving CSOs are NGOs that are not formally representative but nevertheless have legitimacy by virtue of their development work with poor and excluded communities at the grassroots, their expertise in development-related approaches and techniques (e.g. participatory approaches, disaster mitigation, humanitarian assistance etc) and/or the quality of their policy-related research.[xvi] It is these attributes rather than any kind of representativeness that provide NGOs with the legitimacy to engage with the policy process and to sit at the table with policymakers in government and donor agencies.

Donors and development commentators are increasingly wary of CSOs claiming to represent certain constituencies when in reality they do not have representative lines of accountability. In a functioning multi-party democracy, domestic accountability should hinge on the relationship between citizens, parliament (as citizens’ elected representatives) and government and CSOs must complement this all-important relationship rather than substitute for perceived weaknesses in that relationship.

6.2 Relations between ICSOs and LCSOs

Relationships between ICSOs and LCSOs have generally been cordial. ICSOs have facilitated development and growth of many LCSOs. For example, Christain Serice Committee that was referred to above was sustained by ICSOs. Also the birth of CONGOMA itself has roots in ICSOs. ICSOs have provided both financial and technical support to LCSOs. Indeed several LCSOs view ICSOs as their mother. However changes in funding mechanisms and modalities globally are contributing to significant changes in relations between ICSOs and local CSOs at country level, as the following section reveals.

Sub-contracting to ICSOs. A particularly notable feature of changing aid relations appears to be donors’ increased practice of sub-contracting the management of CSO programmes to ICSOs– a practice explicitly recognised by DFID’s recent paper, ` Civil Society and Development’: `Most of the country offices’ work supporting civil society is managed through intermediaries. These intermediaries can be local institutions, civil society networks, or local civil society organisations. Country offices also use international civil society organisations as intermediaries.’[xvii] Although ICSOs are mentioned last in this list, in practice more ICSO intermediaries are contracted – at least in the initial stages of programme establishment – because of their size and capacity in comparison to local CSOs.

Malawi National Aids Commission sub-contracting to INGO umbrella organisations

The National Aids Commission (NAC) Malawi now supports district and community HIV/AIDS interventions through sub-grants. These sub-grants are managed by five international NGOs (Canadian Physicians for Aid and Relief, ActionAid International Malawi, World Vision International, Save the Children USA, and Plan International) that have responsibility for managing funding to community based and faith based organisations in specific districts.

These ICSOs submit budget proposals to NAC for consideration on the basis of district work plans and once funding is agreed encourage CBOs and FBOs to apply for funding. The ICSOs carry out needs assessments, and support local partners through training in areas such as proposal writing, project and financial management and in how to work with local assemblies to mainstream HIV/AIDS in local development planning.The National AIDS Commission Umbrella Organizations Programme is such example, whereby five ICSOs were contracted to manage the programme in different parts of the country.

In the words of a DFID official, DFID regards itself as a `wholesaler’ of funds to CSOs, not a `retailer’. In the context of a rise in the UK aid budget and a planned decrease in staff numbers, bilateral engagement with large numbers of individual local CSOs is not regarded as an efficient use of DFID country office resources or its comparative advantage. In DFID Malawi’s view, it is more appropriate for the retailing of funds to local CSOs to be carried out by international CSOs and occasionally by large, well-established local CSOs.

6.3 CSOs’ relations with the Legislature and political opposition parties

Experiences in Malawi suggest that it is indeed possible for CSOs and parliamentarians to collaborate constructively together and thereby influence constitutional change and/or government policy. Many of the policy achievements attributed (at least in part) to CSOs over the past few years stem from their collaboration with parliamentarians in some way: the fight against the former president’s attempt for a third term; a strengthening of the Electoral Commission, and the Constitutional review process.

As one might expect, collaboration between CSOs and parliaments tends to happen when CSOs take the initiative, not the other way round. ActionAid International Malawi, for example, facilitated the formation of the Malawi Parliamentary Coalition on IFIs (MAPCOI), a multi-party grouping of Parliamentarians providing oversight over IFI agreements or negotiations with the government.

But it is clear that CSOs are themselves being encouraged to work with parliaments by donors in order to build parliament’s capacity to hold governments to account over the use of public resources. For example, DFID and CIDA (Canada) fund collaboration between CSOs and parliamentarians with regard to public expenditure decision making through the five-year long Tikambirane Project. This project is intended `to increase the capacity of civil society to participate in public expenditure decision making and to increase the capacity of the Government of Malawi to receive and incorporate public input into public expenditure decision making.’ Through this project, three local organisations – the Malawi Economic Justice Network (MEJN), Malawi Institute of Journalism (MIJ), and the Economics Association of Malawi (ECAMA) – work with seven parliamentary committees.

Ultimately, CSOs would be advised to weigh up the advantages and disadvantages of working with parliaments compared to other forms of policy and advocacy work - irrespective of donors’ interests in promoting CSO engagement with parliaments. The parliamentary committees that are supposed to hold ministries accountable are usually drastically understaffed, underfunded and underpowered and there is a danger that CSOs could end up substituting for this serious lack of resources in some cases. Whatever the case, until parliamentarians themselves have acquired real political power, ‘parliamentary scrutiny’ is a relatively meaningless notion and CSOs’ advocacy efforts may be better applied elsewhere.

Relationship with political parties have not been obvious as such. In the run up to elections and other possibilities of political change, CSOs have been interpreted or seen to side with Political opposition parties. This was the case towards 1993 when a national referendum was held and ushered in multipartism. The same was seen in 1994 (first multiparty elections) when Bakili Muluzi replaced Kamuzu Banda as president of Malawi. In 1999 (second multiparty elections) same trends occured, no wonder Gwanda Chakuamba (formerly of MCP) cried foul that the elections were rigged and he had support of many CSOs who were willing to support his court appeals. The 2004 (third multiparty) elections were even more interesting. This is the election that saw Bingu wa Mutharika elected President of Malawi on dubious procedures. There is strong belief that the UDF government rigged the elections and to-date is a case in the high court challenging his election.7. Ten Years from now: Recommendations to CSOs

Years are approaching when civil society will have to prove that they are a force to be accommodated. They need to prove (they will continue) to be independent, accountable and responsive to the needs of the poor communities that they claim to represent and serve.
The following section gives some recommendations of what needs to be done in this quest. By way of clarification, this section does not attempt to analyse all of the diverse and multiple steps by the CSOs to the current and future political and social contexts in the country (whether it be petitions and other forms of public campaigning, citizens’ juries, direct action such as demonstrations or strikes, investigative journalism, radio broadcasts or other forms of public education). It focuses more narrowly on the evolution of CSOs’ work targeted primarily at state and donor authorities.

7.1 Positioning of CSOs to effectively respond to the dynamic government and donor policy environment

CSOs are by no means to be passive recipients of the recent shifts in government and donor policies and mechanisms described in this paper. CSOs have played a part in shaping some shifts and are therefore also `architects’ to some extent. Consultations to this paper indicate that CSOs are actively adapting their own thinking and approaches in the changing policy context.

7.2 Increase CSOs’ policy and advocacy activities

As the paper has shown above, there is reported an increase in policy and advocacy-related activities amongst CSOs in recent years. However, again as the sections above stated, the increase has coincided with the promotion of the Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy by the donor community and the opportunities this have presented for civil society engagement in policy processes. Donors have encouraged CSOs to embrace PRS process by providing funding specifically earmarked for policy and advocacy. More recently, Budget Support donors have been particularly keen to encourage CSO monitoring and scrutiny of public budgets and expenditure, as a means of improving the accountability of the government to its citizens and the proper use of aid monies channeled through government budgets. Hence the increase in funding available for CSO budget monitoring activities in Malawi.

In the course of consulting stakeholders for this paper, a number of CSOs representatives indicated that their organisations had changed their work and structures in recent years in response to changes in external funding and policies. This is not correct as there is potential for CSOs to be derailed and serve the interest of the donor at the expense of the poor communities that they are to serve. There is therefore urgent need to establish sustainable source of funding for the CSOs. The fund must not have any donor strings. Meanwhile CSOs need to challenge the underlying structures and power relations that gave rise to their not being able to set their own agenda.

It would be inaccurate to suggest that LCSOs and ICSOs have only responded to either donor or government agendas in an effort to access fresh resources. Domestic political factors have also played significant roles. The introduction of multi-party elections over the last decade, after 31 years of single-party domination, and a gradual shift from authoritarian to more open and tolerant political culture have influenced the focus of CSOs. Specifically in Malawi, a new democratic constitution drawn up after the fall of the Banda regime enshrined a Bill of Rights which included the right to freedom of association and this facilitated a proliferation of new-style CSOs, either solely or partially dedicated to policy and advocacy work. Banda had only permitted certain faith-based organisations to operate and had restricted their operations to service delivery. Thus further opportunities do exist.


7.3 CSOs’ capacity deficit

Government and donors often seem frustrated that CSOs are not moving fast enough to embrace new areas of work. One donor representative, for example, asserted that CSOs were reluctant to venture out of the traditional `comfort zone’ of service delivery. Malawian CSOs, on the other hand, have countered that it is a capacity deficit in these new areas that is holding them back.

CSOs’ perceived lack of capacity i.e physical resources, time and dedicated staff, but also skills and capabilities of CSOs necessary to engage meaningfully in policy processes remains a predominant concern amongst a range of stakeholders in the country. Apart from a handful of very specialised, policy-orientated CSOs, most CSOs still have few staff if any dedicated solely to research, alternative thinking and creation and policy/advocacy work and they rely heavily on external consultants for specific policy-related activities

Ironically, CSOs’ policy capacity deficit seems to have been accentuated by the democratization and policy spaces provided e.g. introduction of MPRS. The problem is compounded by the holistic, multi-sectoral nature of PRS, covering a range of areas identified as strategic for poverty reduction. CSOs may be invited to attend a meeting on agricultural extension services one day, and a meeting on constitutional review the next. CSOs may respond to these demands by specialising rather than trying to cover a multiplicity of issues and activities - either in a certain thematic area, or in a certain activity, with the result that we may see more of a differentiation between policy-oriented CSOs and those delivering services in the future. That there are now CSOs in Malawi dedicated solely to policy and advocacy is an indication that trends are already moving in this direction, although the majority of CSOs still combine policy and advocacy work with more traditional development activities.

Donors’ esteem for CSOs often comes from their perceived proximity to poor communities on the ground – a closeness that is frequently sustained through service delivery. A NORAD policy paper, for example, recognises that direct support to civil society actors `contributes to the establishment and maintenance of links to the local level – links that are often lost in the sector-wide approaches.’[xviii] As many CSOs shift the focus of interventions from simply the provision of direct benefits to the empowerment of poor communities to claim basic rights, often through advocacy and campaigning, the situation becomes less clear.[xix] Engagement at a grassroots level does not have to depend on service delivery. This assumption that CSO legitimacy is derived from their role in welfare and service delivery may discourage CSOs from confining their activities solely to policy and advocacy-related activities.

Aside from specialisation, the other logical response to the capacity deficit is to share and pool policy capacity through networking.


7.4 Remember the district!

In spite of the plethora of policy oriented CSOs that have sprung up in recent years, district-level influencing appears to be weak. Consultations to this paper showed that the dearth of NGO policy influencing at a district level is disappointing but less of an issue because of the absence of any real decentralization, including public funds, to the district level. However since 2004, more resources are channeled directly to the districts and District Commissioners are controlling officers. It is high time therefore that policy focused CSOs prioritise district level policy and practice.

7.5 Improve CSO accountability

Calls for greater CSO accountability and transparency have resonated, particularly amongst government staff. For example, a government official expressed the view that CSOs are more accountable to their donors than to the people they are serving, but`You can vote out a government but not CSOs,’ he asserted. This could be interpreted as a government backlash to the increasing challenges mounted by CSOs to government’s own accountability. But it probably also reflects a growing disquiet amongst the government and donors alike about CSOs’ legitimacy in general. Who do CSOs represent? On whose behalf are they advocating? Have they contributed sufficient resources to warrant admittance to high-level policy processes? Is their work of sufficiently high calibre to be taken seriously? As donors’ focus shifts more towards state institutions and as CSOs’ role in the bigger picture arguably recedes, CSOs are clearly going to have to work harder to justify their right to a place at the table.

There is some defensiveness on the part of CSOs to these accusations. CSOs responded to the criticisms of the Malawian government official by saying that the funds they receive to implement their activities are not Malawian taxpayers’ funds and that therefore they are not accountable to Government. At the same time, CSOs themselves are increasingly conscious of the need to improve their own transparency and standards of accountability. Action must be taken to develop a CSO Code of Conduct.
7.6 Check on Donor’s accountability

To whom is a donor country office accountable? Through what means, then, can CSOs in Malawi hope to influence the agendas of donors providing Budget Support? These were questions that the author of this paper asked. Presumably donor staff are accountable to their home Cabinet and by extension, their home parliament and taxpayers. Given the emphasis given on the donor-government partnership, donor offices claim they also regard themselves as accountable to the Malawi (host) government. But accountability to the country’s civil society – let alone its poor citizens whom donors seek to support - does not seem to enter into the equation. Clearly, the watchdog function donors are encouraging CSOs to fulfill with regard to monitoring government behaviour is supposed to extend to CSOs monitoring donor behaviour in Malawi. To site the DFID example, significantly, the only reference made by DFID’s new paper `Civil Society and Development’ to the role of civil society in influencing British government policy is in relation to British civil society in the UK. By that token, International CSOs with British headquarters, origins or constituencies would appear to have a legitimate prerogative to hold DFID to account. But no such role is envisaged for southern, non-British CSOs. Unless this is checked, CSO impact will be difficult in the years to come.

This paper further recommends that there be established an appropriate forum to enable government, CSOs and donors to discuss the national agenda and obtain political will, consensus and common understanding on issues of national development.’


END NOTES
[1] Currently Mr. Faiti is Cabinet Minister of Economic Planning and Development in the Bingu wa Mutharika administration.
[i] World Bank www.worldbank.org\topics\cso\0
[ii] ibid
[iii] MGDS is Malawi Growth and Development Strategy, a successor of the Mlawi Poverty Reduction Strategy
[iv] World Trade Organisation, Geneva
[v] Early Managers were Tom Kolvin and later Brown Colsby
[vi] Mr. Ted Nandolo was Programme Officer at CSC then and is now the Executive Director of Council of NGOs in Malawi (CONGOMA)
[vii] See ActionAid and Care “From Watchdogs to subcontractors: 2006
[viii] Ref ODI and rapid, ‘Policy Engagement: How Civil Society can be more Effective,” 2006
[ix] Ref IMF Factsheet, `Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, Sept 2005. www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/prsp.htm
[x] Ref: `Joint World Bank and IMF Report on Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers – Progress in Implementation 2005 PRS Review’ Concept Note, Feb 2 2005.
[xi] Ref: `Background briefing: Poverty Reduction Strategies. June 2001 – second edition, DfID website.
[xii] Ref: This is the anecdotal perception of interviewees. Regrettably, figures disaggregating the amount of funding dedicated to different types of CSO activity was not available from any other donors contacted in relation to this paper.
[xiii] Ref: Jeremy Gould, `The New Conditionality’ Zed Books, 2006.
[xiv] WSF Principles 2001
[xv] Lawson M, Ng’ambi F and Magalasi 2001
[xvi] Ref. Trish Silkin of Mokoro Consultants
[xvii] Ref. `Civil Society and Development, p.12.
[xviii] Ref. NORAD `How to Deal with Direct Support to Civil Society’ p.5
[xix] Ref to Gould and Ojanen re latter point


[1] World Bank www.worldbank.org\topics\cso\0
[1] ibid
[1] MGDS is Malawi Growth and Development Strategy, a successor of the Mlawi Poverty Reduction Strategy
[1] World Trade Organisation, Geneva
[1] Early Managers were Tom Kolvin and later Brown Colsby
[1] Mr. Ted Nandolo was Programme Officer at CSC then and is now the Executive Director of Council of NGOs in Malawi (CONGOMA)
[1] See ActionAid and Care “From Watchdogs to subcontractors: 2006
[1] Ref ODI and rapid, ‘Policy Engagement: How Civil Society can be more Effective,” 2006
[1] Ref IMF Factsheet, `Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, Sept 2005. www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/prsp.htm
[1] Ref: `Joint World Bank and IMF Report on Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers – Progress in Implementation 2005 PRS Review’ Concept Note, Feb 2 2005.
[1] Ref: `Background briefing: Poverty Reduction Strategies. June 2001 – second edition, DfID website.
[1] Ref: This is the anecdotal perception of interviewees. Regrettably, figures disaggregating the amount of funding dedicated to different types of CSO activity was not available from any other donors contacted in relation to this paper.
[1] Ref: Jeremy Gould, `The New Conditionality’ Zed Books, 2006.
[1] WSF Principles 2001
[1] Lawson M, Ng’ambi F and Magalasi 2001
[1] Ref. Trish Silkin of Mokoro Consultants
[1] Ref. `Civil Society and Development, p.12.
[1] Ref. NORAD `How to Deal with Direct Support to Civil Society’ p.5
[1] Ref to Gould and Ojanen re latter point